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Abstract 
 
Hong Kong was once touted for the openness of its press and its vibrant independent 
publishing scene. Now, seemingly reputable news organizations, such as the South 
China Morning Post, are undergoing editorial shifts and engaging in self-censorship 
while independent book publishers are being replaced by Chinese state-owned 
companies. These changes are a result of years of direct and indirect pressure on these 
industries by the Chinese government, which began even before the 1997 handover. 
In the past decade, these tactics have become more overt and their effects on the city’s 
news organizations and book publishers are increasingly visible. Through interviews 
with journalists and book publishers, textual analyses and a look into the operations of 
Hong Kong’s journalism and book publishing industries since the handover, this 
thesis presents the various methods utilized by the Chinese government to exert 
control and outlines the toll they have taken on Hong Kong’s press freedom.   
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Introduction 
 
The midnight of July 1, 1997 marked the handover of Hong Kong from colonial 
Britain to China, and on the global stage, many questions were raised over the future 
of the newly established Special Administrative Region. The “one country, two 
systems” constitutional principle found in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 
and the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, affirms that there is “one China” 
but grants Hong Kong autonomy for 50 years after the reunification. Chapter 1, 
Article 5 of the Basic Law states: “The socialist system and policies shall not be 
practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous 
capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.” 1 Under this 
principle, Hong Kong’s domestic affairs, including its judiciary, were left to Hong 
Kong lawmakers and the pre-handover social and economic systems of the city were 
maintained. At the time of the transition, Hong Kong’s free press was celebrated for 
its role as a critic of both the colonial power and the Chinese government. Press in 
China was largely state-owned and far from pluralistic, therefore there were worries 
that Hong Kong’s journalism industry would eventually follow suite. 
This concern was addressed in the constitutional framework of the Special 
Administrative Region. Freedom of press and freedom of expression are formally 
guaranteed in both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Article 3(5) of the Joint 
Declaration states that the Hong Kong law will protect rights and freedoms of the 
                                                
1 “Hong Kong: Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China,” July 1, 1997, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53d0.html. 
	 6	
Hong Kong people.2 This is further supported by Annex I, Part XIII, which 
guarantees that the rights in place before the handover, including freedom of press 
and freedom of speech, will be protected. The Basic Law further specifies these 
freedoms. Article 28 states:  
 
“The freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. No 
Hong Kong resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention 
or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident or 
deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person shall be prohibited. 
Torture of any resident or arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of the life of any 
resident shall be prohibited.”3 
 
The preceding article, Article 27, explicitly guarantees the freedom of press and 
states, “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of 
publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and demonstration; 
and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and strike.”4 Therefore, there 
cannot be any policies in Hong Kong that overtly constraints the publication of any 
content, other than for indecent or pornographic material.  
 Almost 23 years after the handover, Hong Kong’s press freedom has legally 
remained unchanged, as proposed Article 23 prohibiting “treason, secession, sedition 
and subversion” against the Central government failed to be implemented after public 
                                                
2 “The Joint Declaration,” Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, accessed May 
11, 2020, https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/joint3.htm. 
3 “Hong Kong: Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China.” 
4 Ibid. 
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backlash.5 Despite of this, the reputation of the city’s press has taken a severe hit, and 
claims of self-censorship and economic pressure have become commonplace. While 
believed by some to have been an immediate result of the 1997 handover, Hong 
Kong’s press industry did not change suddenly after July 1, 1997. In fact, the most 
substantial changes to and constraints on the industry have been applied in the last 
decade. 
 Although China did not initially make an overt effort to curb Hong Kong’s 
freedom of press, the Central government was constantly monitoring the city’s news 
media and book publishing industries. As China became an economic superpower, not 
only were mainland Chinese becoming wealthier and accumulating capital, but the 
country’s large consumer market became attractive to businessmen globally. The 
Central government leveraged its status in the global economy and was able to subtly 
influence Hong Kong’s press through economic means. While mainland capital began 
entering the city, so did the capital of individuals with business interests in the 
country, who were able to use the ownership of media organizations as strategic 
collateral in their relationships with China. These relationships and changes in media 
ownership weren’t simply market induced but encouraged, as businessmen with these 
assets were able to garner clout within China that was used for economic and political 
favors. The Chinese government, through economic suppression and limiting access 
to information, also strived to create a correlation between news organizations that 
were economically successful and those that were favorable to China in their 
reporting.  
                                                
5 Carol P. Lai, Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change, 1967-
2005. (Routledge Media, Culture and Social Change in Asia, 2008): 181. 
	 8	
 The highly publicized disappearances of the Causeway Bay booksellers 
brought Hong Kong’s independent book publishing industry into the global spotlight. 
Many believed that the abduction of these booksellers, some of which occurred 
outside the borders of China, violated the principle of “one country, two systems” and 
attributed the following collapse of Hong Kong’s book publishing industry to these 
disappearances. While this intimidation played a major role, Chinese government 
initiatives began affecting the industry years prior. In the case of both Hong Kong’s 
book publishing and journalism industry, the administration of Xi Jinping marked the 
prioritization and the use of overt tactics in addressing the city’s freedom of press. Jin 
Zhong, veteran book publisher and journalist, stated “The Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
era was more relaxed, but now since Xi Jinping has come into power in the past 8 
years, [Hong Kong’s book publishing industry] has become tighter and more 
restricted.”  
 This thesis aims to assess the status of Hong Kong’s press freedom more than 
two decades after the 1997 handover by looking at both the book publishing industry 
and local press. The first chapter examines the various factors that led to the demise 
of Hong Kong’s previously thriving independent publishing scene. This will include a 
discussion of the disappearances of the Causeway Bay booksellers and its effect on 
the industry, but will also address the combination of economic and social tactics used 
by the Chinese government prior to that event. The chapter that follows will outline 
the methods used by the Chinese government in limiting Hong Kong’s journalistic 
freedom. This section will include interviews with current Hong Kong-based 
journalists who discuss their own experiences in the newsroom. Finally, this thesis 
presents a case study of Hong Kong’s most widely read English-language paper, the 
South China Morning Post, which has gone through major editorial changes since the 
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handover. By condensing these observations and evaluating Hong Kong’s current 
media landscape, this thesis will argue that Hong Kong’s press freedom has 
considerably eroded after the handover as a result of increasing political, economic 
and social constraints exerted by the Chinese government, most notably in the last 
decade.   
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Chapter 1: Hong Kong’s Book Publishing Industry  
 
Cheung Chi-Ping, Lui Por, Lam Wing-kee, Gui Minhai and Lee Bo, all owners 
and employees of the Hong Kong bookstore Causeway Bay Books and the publishing 
house which owns it, went missing between October and December of 2015.6 With 
little to no information available to any friends or family, it slowly became clear that 
Chinese authorities were behind their abrupt disappearances. Although these 
kidnappings dealt a severe blow to Hong Kong’s once flourishing publishing industry, 
which went into a deep slump soon after, China’s attack on Hong Kong’s book 
publishing actually began years before. 
 
Early Beginnings 
Thanks to the legal protection guaranteed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law, politically sensitive books that were banned from publication in 
China, found their home in Hong Kong’s numerous independent bookstores. These 
“banned books”, a term unique to Hong Kong, are usually of the following categories 
according to Jin Zhong, editor of Open Magazine and known Hong Kong publisher: 
books related to political scandals or private lives involving the top Communist Party 
leadership, ethnic separatism and the party history of the CCP.7 The Private Life of 
Chairman Mao, written by Mao Zedong’s private doctor Li Zhisui, was published in 
1994 and was one of the first such books that created a worldwide stir, as it exposed 
                                                
6 James Tager, “Writing on the Wall: Disappeared Booksellers and Free Expression in 
Hong Kong” (PEN America, November 5, 2016). 
7 Jin Zhong, Interview with Jin Zhong, January 2, 2020. 
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previously unknown unsavory aspects of Mao’s life.8 The book was soon banned 
from publication in China, and mainland Chinese bookstores were not allowed to 
carry it but the demand from Chinese readers remained unchanged. An appetite was 
created for similar content and salacious books like these continued to be published 
and distributed in Hong Kong.9 More recently, the downfall of former Communist 
Party official Bo Xilai in 2012, including his trial on corruption charges and his wife’s 
implication in the murder of a British businessman, created a peak in the demand for 
political books.10 Bao Pu, founder and publisher of New Century Press in Hong Kong, 
said in an interview with PEN America that around 150 books were published on this 
topic in 2013, and that half of them were published by Mighty Current Media, the 
publishing house that owned Causeway Bay Books and employed the five men who 
were abducted.11   
People began to depend on Hong Kong’s independent bookstores for these 
usually political gossip books, known as zhengzhi baguashu.12 As an increasing 
number of tourists from mainland China began to enter Hong Kong, they often 
returned home carrying these books. With 34.9 million Chinese nationals entering 
Hong Kong in 2012, a highly profitable market was created that propelled Hong 
Kong’s robust independent publishing industry.13 Paul Tang, founder of People’s 
                                                
8 Richard Bernstein, “The Tyrant Mao, as Told by His Doctor,” The New York Times, 
October 2, 1994, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/02/world/the-tyrant-
mao-as-told-by-his-doctor.html. 
9 Bao Pu, Interview with Bao Pu, January 6, 2020. 
10 Juliana Liu, “HK Booksellers ‘author’ Attacks China,” BBC News, February 4, 
2016, sec. China, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35480229. 
11 Tager, “Writing on the Wall: Disappeared Booksellers and Free Expression in 
Hong Kong.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Chris Buckley, “On Hong Kong Shelves, Illicit Dirt on China’s Elite,” The New 
York Times, May 18, 2013, sec. World, 
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Recreation Community bookstore in Hong Kong, estimated in a 2013 interview with 
The Atlantic that around 90 percent of his business is from mainland Chinese 
customers who purchase political books.14 In 2014, Hong Kong’s publishing industry 
contributed HK$14 billion to the city and generated 40,000 jobs.15 
 
Causeway Bay Bookseller Disappearances  
 While many smaller Hong Kong publishers contribute to the industry, Mighty 
Current Media made up a whopping third of the market for such provocative books, 
according to Bei Ling, the director of Independent Chinese PEN, and was known to 
publish titles such as Overseas Mistresses of the Chinese Communist Party and 
Women of the Shanghai Gang.16 The Chinese government has never revealed an 
official stance on Might Current or Causeway Bay Books. However, People’s Daily, a 
state-owned tabloid that is thought to be a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist 
Party, berated the publishing house for “stirring up troubles on the mainland” in an 
opinion piece published on January of 2016, months after the incident.17 In February 
of 2016, Phoenix TV, a Hong Kong based station, televised the confessions of the five 
booksellers. Four of them confessed to the illegal trading of books across the border 
                                                
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/asia/exposes-of-chinas-elite-a-big-lure-
in-hong-kong.html. 
14 Chris Horton, “In Hong Kong, a Sanctuary for Banned Books,” The Atlantic, April 
10, 2013, sec. China, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/in-hong-
kong-a-sanctuary-for-banned-books/274831/. 
15 Brian Yap, “Literature Lovers Camp out Overnight as Hong Kong Book Fair 
Begins,” South China Morning Post, accessed February 29, 2020, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1555367/literature-lovers-camp-out-
overnight-hong-kong-book-fair-begins. 
16 Tager, “Writing on the Wall: Disappeared Booksellers and Free Expression in 
Hong Kong.” 
17 单仁平, “单仁平：少数港人不应动辄质疑‘一国两制,’” People’s Daily, accessed 
February 23, 2020, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJSR5H. 
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from Hong Kong into the mainland, a crime that had no legal precedent in China, 
identifying Gui as the leader behind the scheme. 18 After Lam’s release, he described 
his detention and stated that the confession was scripted and coerced. In an article for 
the Hong Kong Free Press, he wrote, “The previous confessions had been based off of 
the script that I had been given, of which I read off mechanically word by word. Shi 
was also the director.”19 In February of 2020, Gui was sentenced to 10 years in prison 
after he was tried in January for “providing intelligence overseas”.20 While he was 
formally released from detention in October of 2017, he was required to stay in 
Ningbo and was seized once again months later, from a train to Beijing where he was 
with two diplomats from the Swedish Consulate in Shanghai.21  
 The crime of “illegal smuggling” may sound familiar to those aware of the 
case of Yao Wentian, another Hong Kong book publisher who was sentenced to ten 
years in jail in the mainland two years prior.22 Under the impression he was delivering 
paint to a friend in Shenzhen, he was arrested soon after he crossed the border and 
                                                
18 Ned Levin, “Hong Kong Booksellers Confess to Illegal Sales in China,” Wall Street 
Journal, March 1, 2016, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-
booksellers-confess-to-illegal-sales-in-china-1456747083. 
19 Wing Kee Lam, “The Missing Bookseller: Lam Wing-Kee’s Ordeal, in Full and in 
His Own Words,” Hong Kong Free Press HKFP, September 11, 2016, 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/09/11/missing-bookseller-lam-wing-kees-ordeal-
full-words/. 
20 Austin Ramzy, “China Sentences Hong Kong Bookseller Gui Minhai to 10 Years in 
Prison,” The New York Times, February 25, 2020, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/world/asia/gui-minhai-china-hong-kong-
swedish-bookseller.html. 
21 Chris Buckley, “Chinese Police Seize Publisher From Train in Front of Diplomats,” 
The New York Times, January 22, 2018, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/asia/china-police-bookseller-train-gui-
minhai.html. 
22 “Hong Kong Publisher Yao Wentian Jailed for 10 Years,” Committee to Protect 
Journalists, accessed February 25, 2020, https://cpj.org/2014/05/hong-kong-publisher-
yao-wentian-jailed-for-10-year.php. 
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convicted for illegally smuggling industrial chemicals.23 Prior to his detention, Yao 
was the chief editor of a Hong Kong publishing house, Morning Bell Press, and had 
agreed to publish Chinese Godfather: Xi Jinping by Yu Jie, a US-based author that 
was exiled from China. Yu and Edmund Yao, Yao’s son, believe that the arrest was 
intended to stop the publication of this novel. Edmund Yao said to the New York 
Times, “There is no question that they are trying to punish him for his publishing 
activities through normal criminal charges.” 24 Another publisher, Wu Yisan, signed 
on to publish the book until he received a phone call, which he believed was from or 
linked to Chinese authorities, threatening his safety if he moved forward with the 
book’s publication. 25 Yu’s book was finally published by Jin Zhong.  
While the detention of Yao was worrying for Hong Kong-based publishers, he 
was in mainland China at the time of his abduction, perpetuating the strength of the 
“One Country, Two Systems” principle. With the belief that Hong Kong residents 
were safe till they entered China, the Hong Kong publishing industry, while shaken 
from the abductions, did not see a large change. However, the abduction of Gui 
Minhai, from Thailand and of Lee Bo, from Hong Kong, created a different kind of 
fear as it was understood that China was willing to detain publishers across 
international borders. Jin, who published Chinese Godfather: Xi Jiping, pulled out 
from publishing Yu’s second book on January 3rd of 2016, months after the Causeway 
                                                
23 麦燕庭, “73岁书商姚文田重判10年其子大呼荒谬决上诉,” RFI - 法国国际广播
电台, May 7, 2014. 
24 Chris Buckley, “Hong Kong Man Seeking to Issue Book About Xi Is Held in 
China,” The New York Times, January 28, 2014, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/asia/publisher-of-book-critical-of-
chinas-leader-is-arrested.html. 
25 Chris Buckley, “A Chilling Phone Call Adds to Hurdles of Publishing Xi Jinping 
Book,” Sinosphere Blog (blog), February 19, 2014, 
https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/a-chilling-phone-call-adds-to-
hurdles-of-publishing-xi-jinping-book/. 
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Bay incident. Jin stated that “circumstances had changed” and cited fears from his 
family and friends for his safety if he was to go through with the book’s publication.26   
 The reason behind the Causeway Bay detentions have called for much global 
speculation. Some believe that the arrests may be in retaliation to the printing of a 
specific book, or to pre-empt the publishing of another. Before his disappearance, Lee 
Bo told Juliana Liu, former Hong Kong correspondent for BBC News, that “he 
believed his colleagues had been detained to prevent the publication of a particularly 
sensitive book.”27 Xi Nuo, a U.S. based Chinese author, states that the disappearance 
may have been to stop the publication of his book, Xi Jinping and His Lovers. 
According to him, Gui had agreed to the publication of his book in 2014, but then 
pulled out once he was visited by a Chinese official. Xi claims that shortly before the 
disappearances, Gui had changed his mind about the book’s publication once again 
and was willing to move forward with it. Xi told BBC News, “I’m responsible for this 
so I want to publish this book and tell the Chinese government: the five booksellers, 
they are innocent.”28  
 Despite of this, the more widespread belief is that the abductions were simply 
part of a larger effort to suppress Hong Kong’s independent publishing entirely. It 
wasn’t solely Mighty Current publishers who were arrested but Lam Wing-kee who 
was the owner of Causeway Bay Books. As the manager and former owner of the 
bookstore, he didn’t have a particular say in which books were chosen for publication 
as he was concerned mostly with retail. This suggests that the Chinese government 
                                                
26 Kris Cheng, “Publisher Suspends Launch of Dissident’s New Book on Xi Jinping 
Due to ‘Fear and Pressure,’” Hong Kong Free Press HKFP, January 12, 2016, 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/01/12/publisher-suspends-launch-of-dissidents-
new-book-on-xi-jinping-due-to-fear-and-pressure/. 
27 Liu, “HK Booksellers ‘author’ Attacks China.” 
28 Ibid. 
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didn’t want to stifle individual publications, but create a stigma around the industry as 
a whole. To destroy the industry, the Chinese government had to not only scare 
publishers and employees, but customers as well. “The impact of the kidnapping case 
is that it popularised the idea that buying these books and publishing these books or 
having anything to do with these kinds of books is dangerous. The public got the 
message, so what you see is the diminishing of the customers that come to Hong 
Kong to buy these books,” said Bao Pu in an interview.29 The fear of customers was 
likely propelled by the testimony of Lam Wing-Kee, after his return to Hong Kong. 
He revealed in a press conference with Hong Kong lawmaker Albert Ho that he was 
allowed to enter Hong Kong under the condition that he would return with a hard 
drive containing records of 4,000 books and over 600 customers.30 Additionally, in 
the article detailing his detention in Hong Kong Free Press, he states that he was 
instructed to work in the bookshop on his release and report the names of customers 
who buy politically sensitive books. He writes:  
“What was even scarier afterwards then, as the man named Shi had told me, was 
that I had to continue working in the bookshop after I came back to Hong Kong. 
He would be in contact then so I could report what was happening, through text 
or photographs. They wanted to understand what was going on in Hong Kong, 
especially those who were buying books about political theories. I were to be 
his ears and his eyes in the future.”31 
                                                
29 Bao, Interview with Bao Pu. 
30 Kris Cheng, “Banned Book Seller Says Chinese Authorities Demanded Hard Drive 
Containing Details of Some 600 Customers,” Hong Kong Free Press HKFP, June 16, 
2016, sec. HKFP Reports, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/06/16/banned-book-
seller-says-authorities-in-china-demanded-hard-drive-contraing-details-of-some-600-
customers/. 
31 Lam, “The Missing Bookseller.” 
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Effect of the Disappearances  
 The disappearances scared publishing houses, bookstores and customers alike. 
The most immediate evidence of the aftermath can be seen in the 2016 Hong Kong 
Book Fair that happened months after the disappearances. The Hong Kong Book Fair 
is regarded as an annual celebration of Hong Kong’s diverse publishing industry, and 
offers visitors both classic and modern publications of various genres. The 2014 book 
fair had 570 exhibitors from 31 different countries, with students lining up overnight 
to be the first few through the door.32 In 2016, the tone of the festival has changed, 
according to Ilaria Maria Sala of The Guardian. She states that there were fewer 
stands selling banned books, with prominent publishers of politically sensitive books, 
such as the Mirror Media Group, missing entirely.33 Greenfield and the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong (CUHK) were still present, with politically sensitive books 
on displays. However, a CUHK editor told Sala, “We have had no problem in printing 
or distributing our four volumes on Zhao Ziyang but the impact on the fair is very 
strong. The controls on travellers have been strengthened, and many who came to 
Hong Kong to buy books censored in mainland China have stopped buying them, as 
they may get into trouble at the border.”34 Other smaller publishers, such as 
Subculture and Initium, are present, however their sales are visibility scarce. Pang Chi 
                                                
32 Yap, “Literature Lovers Camp out Overnight as Hong Kong Book Fair Begins.” 
33 Ilaria Maria Sala, “Hong Kong Book Fair Subdued after Bookseller 
Disappearances,” The Guardian, July 25, 2016, sec. Books, 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jul/25/hong-kong-book-fair-subdued-after-
bookseller-disappearances. 
34 Sala. 
	 18	
Ming, director of Subculture told Apple Daily that there is a “white terror” in the 
publishing industry which has repressed the publishing of sensitive books.35  
 The Hong Kong airport is another place that exemplified the drastic effect of 
the disappearances. Naturally, the airport was an extremely popular place to purchase 
politically sensitive books for the mainland Chinese going back home. Renee Chiang, 
co-owner of New Century Press and wife of Bao Pu, told CNN, "The airport was an 
important part of the independent publishing industry of Hong Kong, as the vast 
majority of the readers of books on sensitive political topics are actually mainlanders, 
not local Hong Kong people.”36 In fact, in February of 2016, Michael Forsythe of the 
New York Times reported that Mighty Current was still delivering 500 books to Hong 
Kong’s airport on the heel of the disappearances.37 Soon after this, in April of the 
same year, CNN reported that 11 out of the 16 airport bookstores had closed down. 
Additionally, Page One, a Singapore-owned bookstore, closed down all of its 6 stores 
in the airport while French owned relay closed 5 of 10, leaving only stores that are 
accessible after check-in.38 Other Hong Kong independent bookstores, known as 
“upstairs bookstores” such as 1908 Press, felt the pressure as well, shutting down 
soon after the disappearances. Ramifications are much more recent as well, with 
independent bookstore Anyone Cultural announcing its shutdown at the end of 2019.  
                                                
35 “【明天書展】銅鑼灣書店事件影響印刷至發行都唔敢接中共「禁書」 | 即時
新聞 | 要聞 | 20160719,” Apple Daily, July 19, 2016, 
https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/realtime/article/20160719/55380038. 
36 Elaine Yu, “Hong Kong Airport Shutters Bookstores amid Fears of Eroding Press 
Freedoms,” CNN, accessed February 29, 2020, 
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/hong-kong-airport-bookstores/index.html. 
37 Michael Forsythe, “Disappearance of 5 Tied to Publisher Prompts Broader Worries 
in Hong Kong - The New York Times,” accessed February 29, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/world/asia/mighty-current-media-hong-kong-
lee-bo.html. 
38 Yu, “Hong Kong Airport Shutters Bookstores amid Fears of Eroding Press 
Freedoms.” 
	 19	
With such an immediate and visible aftermath, it is easy to draw the situation 
of Hong Kong’s publishing industry directly to the disappearances of the booksellers. 
While this case was the most overt and direct attack on Hong Kong’s industry by 
China, smaller and more gradual changes were being instituted for years.  
 
Chinese Government Initiatives  
The Chinese government has had concerns over Chinese language media in 
Hong Kong years before the 1997 handover. “The fact is [the Chinese government] 
already controlled Chinese language media even when the British were here. Even 
though the British administration couldn’t care less what the Chinese were reading in 
Hong Kong, mainland China did care,” said Bao.39 As early as 1989, months after the 
Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese Government launched an initiative named 
the “Working Group of National Clean Up and Rectification of Books, Newspapers 
and Audio-visual Markets.”40 Three tasks were initially proposed through this: to 
clean up periodicals, books and audio-visual material, to rectify and compress news 
publications and finally, to do an ideological and organizational reconstruction of 
publishing housings.41 To counteract the increasing number of published materials 
with “severely politically mistaken notion of capitalist liberalism,” the government 
wanted to ensure that the materials circulating within the country promoted strong 
socialist thinking.42 This had immediate and severe effects on China’s domestic 
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publishing industry. Since 1989, the publication of national newspapers went down by 
12.3%, periodicals reduced by 14%, 8% of publishing houses were closed while 
another 11 were consolidated.43   
In February of 2000, the Chinese Communist Party began to prioritize this 
initiative and changed its name to “National Working Group of Anti-Vulgarity and 
Illegal Publications Campaign” or AVIP.44 Liu Qibao, who went on to become Head 
of the Propaganda Department and a member of the Politburo, was chosen to lead the 
campaign which was implemented by 27 government bodies; from the Central 
Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Education to the General Administration 
of Customs and the Ministry of National Security.45 This campaign was publicized as 
effort to sweep down on pornography and clamp down on illegal publications. Posters 
showed a broom sweeping away “yellow pages” or indecent material and a hammer 
coming down on pirated books, while pictures that were circulated showed piles of 
pornographic material in dumpsters. In reality, the campaign was intended to target a 
much wider range of material. To the Chinese government, “illegal books” refer to 
not only pirated materials, as the posters indicated, but publications that violate social 
stability, endanger national security, incite ethnic division or, as stated above, 
compromise socialist thinking.46 The mission of AVIP, as elucidated on the 
campaign’s government website, provides a more holistic understanding of the 
campaign’s goals: 
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AVIP is a matter of the regime, a matter of the party and the country’s 
future and destiny. China is currently the largest socialist country in the world and 
the biggest obstacle to the hegemonic powers. Hostile forces are attempting to 
destabilize and change people’s political beliefs, weaken and slow down the rise of 
China’s overall national strength, and deny and overthrow the party’s leadership. 
In order to further political deception, the methods of ideological and cultural 
penetration become increasingly clandestine. 47  
Considering this mission, it is clear that AVIP was an ideological initiative focused 
on maintaining the power of the CCP and therefore their jurisdiction extended 
beyond the management of vulgar material. The perception of the initiative’s 
success was still, at this time, focused on the seizure of pirated or pornographic 
material. Xinhuanet, a subsidiary of China’s official state-run Xinhua News 
Agency, reported that by September 30th of 2005, Beijing’s AVIP office had seized 
2.14 million illegal publications domestically.48  
 Before 2003, Chinese residents had limited access to Hong Kong and could 
only visit the country as part of group tours or on business visas, hence the flow of 
mainland Chinese tourists to Hong Kong and back was relatively controlled. On 
July of that year, in order to deal with the drop in Hong Kong tourism after the 
SARS outbreak, the Individual Visit Scheme was issued through which mainland 
Chinese residents could receive two-way permits to visit either Hong Kong or 
Macau individually. Following this, the number of Chinese mainland tourists that 
visited Hong Kong grew drastically and by May of 2004, two million visitors had 
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come to Hong Kong under the scheme.49 With this surge in visitors, there was an 
equivalent surge in the volatile publications that were being brought back to the 
mainland. Thus, the Southern Hill Project (南嶺工程) was launched as a campaign 
run by AVIP that specifically targeted “illegal” material that was coming across 
the border. 
 The first project meeting was held on May 31st of 2010 in Zhuhai, 
Guangdong, and included AVIP who met with member units from Beijing, 
Shanghai, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui and Jiangxi, which, other than Beijing, are the 
provinces closest to the Hong Kong border.50 In this meeting, five primary 
objectives were established: to raise political awareness, strengthen leadership, 
promote multi-level cooperation, establish a working mechanism to confront these 
publications and to observe trends in the flow and publication of illegal material.51 
It was decided that these forums would be held annually, so that multiple 
provincial representatives can share their findings and unify in their opposition to 
“politically harmful publications.” 
 While the development of the project alluded to a focus on the Hong Kong 
border, the Special Administrative Region was directly mentioned for the first time 
in 2012, with AVIP’s “Special Action Against Hong Kong’s Politically Harmful 
Publications.” This initiative emphasized targeting propaganda from Falun Gong 
groups, publications that were unfavourable towards Party leaders and publications 
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that advocated for “Tibetan Independence” or Xinjiang separatism.52  The 
Southern Hill Project grew from seven member units in its inception in 2010, to 
twelve in 2014, with the addition of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Guangxi and 
Hainan. Guangdong, with its proximity to Hong Kong, continued to lead the 
project and in just 2014, dispatched a total of 227,000 law enforcement officers, 
inspected 63,000 publication operation units and seized 122.6 types of illegal 
publications.53 Since then, the project has not stopped growing and becoming 
greater prioritized. In 2019, Jiangsu province reported that in the first quarter of the 
year, they investigated 53 AVIP cases, seized over 200,000 illegal publications, 
closed nine illegal websites and deleted more than 2,500 pieces of harmful 
information on the Internet.54 
Many local government notices that were released between 2012 and 2014 
made the scope, departmental involvement and multi-level approach of this project 
clear. As early as 2012, government notices stated that AVIP issued a list of 14 
Hong Kong and Taiwan distributors and 21 types of Hong Kong periodicals to be 
banned and that school campuses had to be cleansed of these illegal publications.55 
Local governments were encouraged to restrain the economic and social activities 
of Hong Kong media outlets with links to reactionary publications, and asked to 
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use commercial, tax and other tools to do so. The Public Security Bureau was 
additionally asked to restrict the return of “special persons” to mainland China. 56  
 Another method that was stated was of strengthening the control of 
domestic printing presses. This is particularly effective considering the cheap cost 
of labor in China and the fact that many Hong Kong publishers took advantage of 
these printing presses in the mainland. This was one of the many ways the Chinese 
government was able to take advantage of the economic volatility of the publishing 
industry. Jin Zhong expands on such economic measures: 
One way they can control publishers is through investment. The publishing 
industry is often very low margin and publishers often need money to tide them 
over, so investment from the mainland can be very important. Another way they 
exercise control of Hong Kong’s publishing industry is by sending people to 
work in Hong Kong-based publishing houses so they can monitor what’s going 
on and influence publishing decisions.57 
 In 2013, Suzhou’s Culture and Athletics Office released a notice that 
outlined their methodologies in countering Hong Kong publications, many of 
which focused on the flow of physical publications across the Hong Kong border 
and back into China. They called to strengthen border and portal inspections by 
increasing the inspection of postal deliveries, tourist luggage and other transport 
methods, and prosecuting those who carried banned material. Notices also made it 
clear that Party members would be “dealt with severely” were they to be caught 
with overseas illegal publications.58 A few months later, a notice was issued by the 
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General Office of the Fuqing People’s Government that called for the Tourism 
Bureau to ensure that tourists traveling to Hong Kong and Taiwan must be 
subjected to propaganda and discouraged from buying and bringing politically 
harmful publications back to China.59 Around this time, it was reported that travel 
agents were threatened with fines if their clients returned to China with illegal 
books.60  
 While Chinese customs is quick to seize books that they deem politically 
harmful, there is no released list which states which publications are barred from 
entry. Considering this, some believe that these decisions are at the whim of the 
customs officials. “They don’t have a list; it’s arbitrary. They take books just 
hoping that you will not have enough energy to argue with them since they are the 
customs. For me, I’m pretty sure my next book is not on their list but the way that 
they conduct business I’m pretty sure my next book won’t get into China either,” 
said Bao Pu.61 According to him, the Beijing airport Is the loosest point of entry 
but even there, half a million publications are confiscated in a typical year.  
The Chinese customs were sued twice by Chinese citizens who questioned 
the arbitrary confiscation of their novels, once in 2009 by Feng Chongyi and once 
in 2013 by Li Nanyang. Feng, a Chinese professor who lives in Australia, filed a 
lawsuit after 11 of his books which were about and purchased in Hong Kong were 
confiscated at the Tianhe Station in Guangzhou. Feng argued that the actions by 
these customs officials violated Article 4 of the PRC Administrative Punishment 
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Law which espouses "principles of fairness and openness.".62 The Tianhe Station 
Customs Office defended itself by claiming that the confiscated books fell under 
the policies outlined in the Measures for Overseeing the Import and Export of 
Printed Materials and Audio-Visual Materials Through Customs and the List of 
Prohibited Items for Import and Export.63 As these lists simply restrict materials 
that are "harmful to China's politics, economy, culture, or morals,” Feng argued 
that a publicized list of books and materials is needed to ensure that the public 
knows whether their goods qualify. No list was produced as a result of this lawsuit. 
In fact, Feng was detained in China for a week in 2017 for reasons purportedly 
related to separate academic research.64 
Li Nanyang sued Beijing airport customs in 2013 after they confiscated 53 
of her father Li Rui’s book, Oral Account of Past Events, which was published 
earlier that year in Hong Kong. Li Rui, a 98-year-old ex-Communist Party official 
still in good standing with the CCP, wrote this book talking about his experience 
under Mao and the trajectory of his career. After the lawsuit was filed in 2013, a 
court in Beijing continued to delay it and again, no list of books was released. In 
fact, Li told New York Times, “I don’t expect to win but I want to draw attention 
to the custom office’s practices.”65 
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Current Industry Structure  
 The impact of the Southern Hill Project and the abductions of the 
booksellers hit the retail market for Hong Kong books hard and subsequently drove 
many Hong Kong publishers out of business, making way for Chinese state-owned 
companies to not only enter, but take over the bulk of the market. Currently, Sino-
United Publishing, an umbrella publishing group, owns the Hong Kong-based 
imprints Chung Hwa Book Company, Commercial Press and Joint Publishing and 
has control over 80% of the Hong Kong market.66 Sino-United owns more than 
half the bookstores in Hong Kong, 53 branches of the aforementioned imprints and 
almost 30 publishing houses.67 According to Radio Television Hong Kong 
(RTHK)’s findings, the umbrella group is owned by Guangzhou-based company 
which is ultimately controlled by the Chinese Finance Ministry.68 In 2015, Next 
Magazine reported that the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government, a 
Chinese central government organ which already owns media outlets such as Wen 
Wi Po, Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong Commercial Daily and Orange News through a 
company titled Guangdong Xiwenhua Development, had taken control of Sino-
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United Publishing.69 Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam defended the legality 
of their action amidst outcries that it violates Article 22 of the Basic Law, which 
states that “no department of the Central People's Government may interfere in the 
affairs which the HKSAR administers on its own in accordance with the law”.70 
 The censorship enacted by this takeover of the Hong Kong publishing 
industry came to head shortly after the 2014 Occupy Central movement, where 
books that weren’t even broadly political were returned to publishers they believed 
to have been sympathetic to the movement. Bao believes that this social movement 
was crucial in further restricting Hong Kong’s market. His own book, he said, was 
being sold by Chinese owned bookstores up until the movement.71 All the imprints 
under Sino-United were allegedly given instructions not to sell any potentially pro-
democracy books.72 Up Publications, a smaller, independent publishing house, 
revealed that Sino-United returned hundreds of books to them shortly after their 
participation in the frontline of the protests.73 Carmen Kwong Wing-suen, editor-
in-chief of the publishing house, stated that her own books were kept out of Sino-
United stores as only 28 copies were ordered in lieu of the regular 200.74 At the 
same time, Sino-United was accused of publishing and distributing at least 5 books 
that were subtly against the movement.75  
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 There are many models that exist when one wants to get a book published, 
the most common of which is the subsidy model. In this model, authors pay for the 
book’s printing and binding process while publishers pay for the editing, 
distributing and marketing. Since independent publishing houses were going out of 
business and Chinese state-owned publishers refused to go through with books that 
were political in nature, if you were attempting to publish a book that may 
inflammatory, this model would hardly be impossible. In this case, those who have 
the resources may choose to self-publish, which would mean that they would pay 
for the all the services themselves, including the printing through a press. 
However, the impact of the Southern Hill Project and the abductions of the 
booksellers reached beyond the retail market for Hong Kong publishers, and also 
badly hit the printing presses. Those who run the printing machines in Hong Kong 
are worried of being potentially targeted were they to run books that angered the 
CCP, so they avoided books on the contemporary history of China altogether. 
Considering this, Hong Kong authors have few options left.76 “Say you’re brave 
enough to publish a book on a forbidden topic, you are not going to get it 
circulated in the major book stores, only the much smaller, independent ones. This 
will really hamper the number of books you are going to sell and this will 
discourage publishers from publishing those kinds of sensitive topics,” said Jin 
Zhong of Hong Kong’s current publishing climate.77 Bao states that many writers 
he knows have pursued e-book publishing such as Amazon. “You just have to give 
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up the idea that you will go through the conventional book publishing channel,” he 
says. 78 
 
Conclusion 
 The Chinese government has been attempting to subdue Hong Kong’s 
publishing industry for decades and through a variety of direct and indirect means 
has succeeded in doing so. First, the Chinese government hurt Hong Kong book 
publishers economically by targeting their sourcing and destroying their retail 
market. As an industry that requires significant economic capital, small changes in 
production costs and revenue can have a dire impact on publishers. The crackdown 
on China-based printing presses and the increased regulation of the Hong Kong 
border have resulted in major losses for Hong Kong publishers. Additionally, the 
most publicized tactics of abduction and intimidation have played a large role in 
further damaging the distribution and retail market of Hong Kong-based publishers 
and authors. The fear and stigma that is now attached to books on Chinese politics 
have discouraged publishers from printing them, bookstores from carrying them 
and consumers from purchasing such books. These tactics left the Hong Kong 
publishing industry highly vulnerable for Chinese companies with large amounts 
of capital to enter the market. These Chinese state-owned book publishers were 
able to take advantage of the economic conditions of independent Hong Kong 
publishers, and effectively replaced them by purchasing large numbers of 
bookstores in Hong Kong. This has effectively changed the landscape of books 
being sold in the city, as books critical of the Chinese government in any capacity 
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can only be found in small, hidden bookstores that are slowly becoming harder to 
find. 
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Chapter 2: Hong Kong Press – Methods of Control 
 
Hong Kong’s reputation as a haven for a free and pluralistic press has taken 
significant hits in the past few decades. The Special Administrative Region’s swift 
fall in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders indicates this change. 
When the Index was established in 2002, Hong Kong ranked 18th, cementing its place 
in the top ten countries in the Asia Pacific.79 By 2013, this position had shifted to 58 
and as of 2020, it now stands at 80, the lowest it has been since the inception of the 
index.80 Reporters without Borders cited the treatment of journalists and media 
personnel through the pro-democracy protests that began in 2019 and the growing 
influence of the Chinese Communist Party’s Hong Kong Liaison Office in local 
affairs as reasons for the drop in the ranking. China, ranking fourth from the bottom in 
the index, has established itself as a country where the state has a strong grip on 
domestic media. However, the “one country, two systems” principle has allowed 
Hong Kong’s media to remain autonomous even after the 1997 handover. In the past 
decade, this autonomy has become increasingly challenged through both political and 
economic means.  
As a British colony, Hong Kong legally did not have the freedom of press that 
it appeared to. The colonial administration had 30 laws, including the Sedition 
Publications Ordinance and the Control of Publications Ordinance, that could be used 
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to prevent and punish news organizations that undermined the state.81 However, in 
practice, these laws were rarely applied, as there was little reason to. Ma Gnok 
describes the relationship between the colonial power and the press as one of 
controlled pluralism.82 Prior to the 1980s, the ideological divide was between the 
rightist KMT-funded papers and the leftist CCP-funded papers. The subsistence of 
this cleavage created a semblance of an open and free press, despite the fact that 
criticisms of the colonial government were few and far between.83 The British 
government carefully chose the newspapers in which they ran advertisements and 
through the Government Information Service, they had a rigid pipeline of information 
that reached selected reporters who would print it disguised as news. Additionally, 
members of pro-government news organizations were given British medals of honors 
as a form of co-optation.84  
After the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong’s political future 
was formalized and increasingly became the focus of news media. As a result, citizens 
began to look for a greater degree of press freedom and the Hong Kong Journalist’s 
Association began checking the government with a stronger voice.85 The 1989 
Tiananmen Square crackdown encouraged both the British government and the 
Chinese Communist Party to transition away from the previous relationship they had 
with the Hong Kong press. An estimated one-fifth of Hong Kong’s population 
actively showed their support for the student protestors in China through protests and 
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vigils, making clear their desire for democracy.86 Christopher Patten, who became 
Hong Kong’s governor in 1992, therefore began to prioritize democratization efforts, 
which included overturning colonial laws such as those that were used to curb the 
freedom of press. Subsequently, the Hong Kong press did not hold back their 
criticisms of the Chinese government’s response to the student uprising, resulting in 
the Chinese government harboring fears of similar subservience from the city’s 
population. Thus, the Chinese government began to immediately heighten their 
involvement with the city’s press. The Xinhua News Agency, officially owned and run 
by the Chinese state, was asked to engage in “monitoring and guiding” the Hong 
Kong Press, to the point of creating a list of Hong Kong’s news organizations 
classified into four categories based on their relationship to the Chinese government.87  
While the British eradicated some of the laws that were in place, many were 
left for Hong Kong’s new government to inherit. As per the precedent set by the 
British, these laws were seldom enacted and provisions within Hong Kong’s Basic 
Law explicitly protected the freedom of press. However, this contradiction created a 
legal framework that bred uncertainty amongst the local press, leading to self-
censorship by Hong Kong journalists. Additionally, during the transition era, the 
media industry in Hong Kong became increasingly profitable and economically 
lucrative. Some major newspapers, including the Oriental Daily, Ming Pao and the 
South China Morning Post, became publically listed and went from smaller, local 
businesses into conglomerates.88 The capital going into the industry grew rapidly and 
so did the competition. Apple Daily, at its establishment in 1995, undercut the prices 
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previously set by the Newspaper Society of Hong Kong and quickly became the most 
popular daily paper.89 This put pressure on the media industry and created a new 
political economy. In this landscape of news media, the Chinese government began to 
use particular methods, some adopted by the previous colonial power, to exert control 
over Hong Kong’s press. Hong Kong, constituting two-thirds of China’s foreign 
investment in 1999, is an important strategic asset to the mainland.90 Thus, there was 
significant economic incentive for the Chinese government to maintain an appearance 
of press freedom, as a free flow of information is crucial to maintaining Hong Kong’s 
position as one of the prominent financial centers of the world. Considering this, 
constraints on Hong Kong’s press were largely incremental and subtle. The primary 
methods used were the co-optation of media ownership, financial pressure, limiting 
access to information and utilizing a vague legal framework intended to induce self-
censorship amongst journalists. 
 
Co-optation of Media Ownership 
One form of media control similar to that of the colonial power was that of 
co-optation through political favors. Starting from years before the handover, 
prominent Hong Kong media executives and owners were given medals and 
prestigious positions in the Central People’s Government. A chart published in 2007 
outlined this “co-optation web” and listed 27 members of the Hong Kong media 
industry who were awarded with such medals, including the Grand Bauhinia Medal 
and Star, or positions such as deputies to the National People’s Congress and the 
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Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.91 The founder of the Ming Pao 
Group and Chairmen of Asia Television (ATV) and the Hong Kong Economic Times 
were a few of the elites that received such honors. This strategy has continued to 
evolve and in a similar chart compiled in 2018, 15 media owners and executives were 
listed including major shareholders of ATV and Cable TV.92 These political favors 
often gave way to immediate editorial shifts. Once high-level executives of Sing Tao 
Daily News and Oriental Daily News were granted such honors and positions, the 
papers went from being pro-KMT to criticizing the democrats.93 This co-optation was 
done through informal means as well, such as banquets, dinners and building 
friendships. In earlier days, Ming Pao editors have been invited to dinner by the head 
of Xinhua’s propaganda department on many occasions.94 Additionally, a column in 
the Oriental Daily that was sometimes critical of China disappeared in 1996 after an 
executive in the newspaper was reported having dinner with the propaganda head of 
Xinhua only days prior.95 Jin Zhong saw this “dinner diplomacy” first-hand after 
publishing the book of a defector of Hong Kong’s Underground Party and inviting the 
columnist for an event. He was invited for dinner by a friend who discouraged him 
from doing so and pushed him to call off the event, which he refused to do.96  
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 The economic pressure of Hong Kong’s media environment made it easy for 
businessmen to take ownership of prominent news organizations. By having 
ownership of an especially strategic commodity, there were able to gain social and 
political capital within China and further their business interests. Malaysian tycoon 
Tiong Hiew King saw his reputation significantly grow in China after his purchase of 
Ming Pao, stated an article in The Initium.97 This incentive provided an explanation 
for how media organizations that were economically failing, such as ATV and Ming 
Pao, were able to attract investors and be sustained.98 By 2017, 9 of the 26 
mainstream media outlets in Hong Kong had mainland Chinese stakes.99 Businessmen 
owners in the media industry often have a wide portfolio and aren’t involved in the 
day-to-day operations of their organizations. However, they exercise a form of 
allocative control by managing upper level staff and making strategic hiring and 
promotion decisions. A large part of this is making sure the “right” journalists, who 
are sympathetic to China, are in roles that give them significant editorial power. A 
2009 study done by Francis L.F. Lee and Joseph Chan showed that top-level 
managers, including chief editors and deputy, assistant or executive chief editors, are 
more politically conservative than those that work under them.100 The shift in editorial 
leadership of Ming Pao during the 2014 Occupy Protests indicates the importance of 
an editor with a particular stance or with the willingness to comply with the 
organization’s owner. The previous chief editor was moved to a different position 
within the organization and the position was filled by a rookie journalist flown in 
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from Malaysia with a closer relationship to the owner.101 Additionally, roles that 
directly report on China are more likely to be filled by journalists from the mainland 
or those that are politically sympathetic to China. The same study showed that 
similarly, China news journalists were more pro-China in their personal views than 
journalists in other positions.102 This also affects which journalists are assigned which 
stories, as politically sensitive stories would be given to journalists whose personal 
stance aligns closely with that of China’s. By intentionally managing high-level staff, 
media owners are able to induce an editorial shift. 
 
Newsroom Socialization  
Chin-Chuan Lee defines self-censorship as “a set of editorial actions ranging 
from omission, dilution, distortion, and change of emphasis to choice of rhetoric 
devices by journalists, their organizations and even the entire media community in 
anticipation of currying reward or avoiding punishments in the power structure.”103 
These editorial actions can be a product of a various methods of control exerted by the 
Chinese government. An 1997 annual report by the Hong Kong Journalists 
Association divides self-censorship into three categories: “direct and indirect external 
pressure on a media organization, pressure within a media organization and 
assimilation of values by journalists.”104 Considering this, it is visible in both the 
political and economic constraints faced by the Hong Kong press. 
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Strategically appointed editors engage in this censorship and are the 
gatekeepers to the information that is eventually published. Some editors, such as 
those working for online news site HK01, are overt in their methods by, for example, 
adding disclaimers when articles are published to distance their organization from 
controversial stances.105 HK01, however, is notorious for a very clear editorial stance 
dictated by its owner, who is also chief editor. Most censorship is much subtler, 
making it sometimes unclear if an editorial choice was, in fact, censorship at all. A 
journalist for Bloomberg China discusses how she is able to distinguish self-
censorship from regular editing of her pieces. She says:  
When you get censored, you just know. When your piece is edited, if the editing is 
done well, you know why the editor has taken something out or changed 
something. There will be a really concrete reason, such as the flow of your piece 
was not clear enough or you need another interview. For censorship, they don’t 
give you reasons. Most of the time, when you write about politics, you know the 
part that they took out is the most important in the story.106 
Like all the journalists that were interviewed, she believed that in the last few 
years, she was having many more conversations with her editors over why they had 
decided to take out sections of her pieces. When she questions them, their answer is 
usually: “I am trying to protect you.”107 For new journalists, these editorial decisions 
have the potential to dictate the way they write their articles, as witnessing repeated 
censorship would instill in them a set of norms to follow in order to move up within 
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the organization. While overt control is likely to result in a backlash from journalists, 
more informal and tacit measures are tolerated, as to respond would be 
unprofessional. This results in socialization in the newsroom. Lee writes, “In Hong 
Kong, those journalists who do not feel subjected to strong control by company 
guidelines far outnumber those who do. They have, in short, “naturalized” the 
organizational perspectives as a standard of taste, conduct, and judgement.”108 
According to the Bloomberg China journalist, this behavior is, more often than not, 
top-down and doesn’t directly reflect the personal stance of editors, but the 
instructions given to them by formal and informal cues from owners and investors.109 
Some journalists also self-censor due to the clear indications given by China 
that some topics are entirely off the table. In a 1996 interview with CNN, Lu Ping, the 
Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs at the time, stated that after 1997, 
“advocating for two Chinas” would be banned. Responding to follow-up questions, 
Lu clarified that writing about Hong Kong and Taiwan independence was “definitely 
not allowed.”110 Another indication was given by Qian Qichen, then Chinese Foreign 
Minister and Vice-Premier, who said in 1996 interview with the Asian Wall Street 
Journal, that personal attacks on Chinese leaders would not be allowed as there was a 
difference between an attack and criticism.111 Since then, this sentiment has only 
intensified. All the journalists interviewed stated that it was understood industry-wide 
that talk of Taiwanese independence, along with Chinese separatism and falun gong, 
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could not be published.112 In 2018, Victor Mallet, who was then vice-chairman of the 
Foreign Correspondents’ Club and the Asia news editor of the Financial Times, 
invited pro-independence activist Andy Chan for a lunchtime talk.113 Both the 
Chinese and Hong Kong governments encouraged Mallet to cancel the talk, which he 
refused to do. A few months after the talk, on his return from Thailand, Mallet was 
denied a working visa and was given no explanation as to why, leading people to 
believe that it was a response to the event he chaired. This controversy has 
perpetuated the anxiety journalists face to broach topics that are publically out of 
bounds. While some censorship is done to preserve the business interests of the 
owners, others are done to protect the organization’s more general financial interests. 
 
Financial Pressure 
The competitive nature of Hong Kong’s press paired with the prevalence of 
the smartphone and internet has made journalism an industry that requires significant 
financial capital. Small reductions of profit could mean a threat to the survival of the 
news organization. Because of this, journalists can be encouraged to self-censor in 
order to maintain business interests in China and refrain from hurting advertising 
revenue. Ming Pao, an initially centrist paper, stated that the State Council’s Hong 
Kong and Macau Office had a blacklist of 19 newspapers and magazines including 
Ming Pao which the Bank of China group was asked not to advertise in.114 Another 
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paper that has suffered financially due to a lack of advertising revenue is Apple Daily, 
an openly pro-democracy and anti-communist newspaper published by the media 
group Next Digital. The Next group’s public listing in 1997 was terminated after Sun 
Hung Kay International, the purported guarantor, suddenly withdrew their support.115 
In 2003, 8 years after the paper’s inception, prominent real estate developers refused 
to advertise in the paper.116 A decade later, Standard Chartered, Hang Seng and 
HSBC pulled millions of dollars of advertising from the paper.117 The financial 
institutions maintained that it wasn’t due to their political stance, however Apple 
Daily believes it was a result of pressure from Hong Kong’s liaison office. The paper 
has also had a turbulent relationship with the former chief executive of Hong Kong, 
C.Y. Leung. Starting from March 16 of 2019, Leung began posting pictures on his 
Facebook page of advertisements in Apple Daily, asking his followers to no longer 
support those businesses, further discouraging companies to advertise in the paper.118 
A journalist for Apple Daily stated that this difficulty in procuring advertising revenue 
has moved the paper to push a subscription model by charging readers for online 
access in order to ensure its financial survival.119 This model is used by the Initium as 
well, a centrist paper, that doesn’t have any advertisements at all and relies on 
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investors and subscriptions.120 “Naming and shaming” is a method used often to exert 
control according to Jin Zhong, who stated that pro-Beijing papers do the same with 
him by criticizing him publically in an effort to discourage him from speaking out.121  
 
Access to Information 
 A significant way that China is curbing Hong Kong press is through limiting 
the access Hong Kong journalists have to the mainland. Much more overt in its 
application, this method been used significantly in the last decade under Xi Jinping, 
according to journalists that were interviewed. Jin Zhong stated that he was the first 
Hong Kong journalist to be banned from China in 1996 and the list of journalists 
facing the same has only grown since then.122 China has been increasingly limiting 
the journalists that are able to enter the country, with journalists from known pro-
democracy papers, namely Apple Daily, finding getting press passes to go to the 
mainland very difficult.123 A journalist from Apple Daily indicated that there is a list 
of journalists that are barred from entering the mainland.124 New journalists have a 
lower chance of being on this list, therefore pro-democracy papers often send rookie 
journalists twho can slip through the cracks to China to report for them. She claimed 
that a decade ago, the restrictions were not nearly as strict, as Hong Kong journalists 
were still able to enter China for exclusive stories. In fact, fear of being detained in 
China has led to reporters that may still be allowed abstaining from going in the 
country at all. A journalist for the Initium stated that since the start of the 2019 
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protests regarding the extradition bill in Hong Kong, she had not gone in to China at 
all as she was afraid of any potential repercussions.125 In recent years, these press 
restrictions have begun to apply to the Special Administrative Region of Macau as 
well. Ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to Macau to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its 
handover from Portugal to China, multiple journalists and media personnel were 
denied entry.126 RTHK, NowTV, Commercial Radio, TVB and South China Morning 
Post all reported that their journalists weren’t allowed through the border, although 
they had been granted press accreditation weeks prior.127 Macau authorities stated that 
their entry was being obstructed under the Internal Security Framework Act as their 
actions could potentially jeopardize public safety, despite the fact that many of them 
were initially invited by the Macau Information Bureau for the event.128  
 For Hong Kong press, the quality of reporting, namely, on China, plays a large 
role in the success of news organizations. Because of this, the Chinese government is 
intentional in selecting the media it engages with thereby gatekeeping the access to 
information. Papers that have a more pro-China stance are more likely to receive 
interviews, access to mainland events and officials and exclusive information directly 
from the Chinese government.129 Officials from the Hong Kong and Macau Office set 
up meetings with particular news executives and perpetuate information through the 
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Government Information Service, a colonial institution that has been maintained.130 In 
fact, a journalist from Initium claimed that China is increasingly sending their own 
state-sponsored journalists to report on events to ensure that it has full control over 
the information being released.131 Finally, the potential of losing important data and 
information from China encourages even international news organizations to comply 
with the Chinese government. For example, Bloomberg was embroiled in controversy 
after it axed an expose on Xi Jinping’s family wealth written by Michael Forsythe, a 
veteran investigative journalist.132 While he was given no explanation, Bloomberg’s 
editor-in-chief Matthew Winkler stated in a call, "It is for sure going to, you know, 
invite the Communist Party to, you know, completely shut us down and kick us out of 
the country.”133 While some believe that this censorship was done to preserve China’s 
role as a large client for Bloomberg’s sale of terminals, others think that the primary 
driving factor was to maintain access to Chinese data that if lost, would compromise 
the quality of their terminals altogether.134  
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Conclusion 
 According to a 2012 survey administered by the Hong Kong Journalists 
Association, 79% of the 663 local journalists surveyed believed that self-censorship 
has risen since 2005, and 36% claimed that they or their supervisors directly practiced 
self-censorship when it came to reports that the owners of their organizations, 
advertisers or the Chinese government could find disagreeable.135 While the Chinese 
government has been using a combination of colonial and new methods to exert 
control over the Hong Kong press since before the handover, this control has only 
intensified with significantly less effort to be overt under the administration of Xi 
Jinping. Many journalists cited the 2019 pro-democracy protests surrounding the 
extradition bill as a turbulent period for Hong Kong press, where editorial constraints 
have begun to show more recognizably in their reporting. Two journalists listed Ming 
Pao, South China Morning Post, HK01, Xing Bao and the Hong Kong Economic 
Times as news organizations whose editorial staff and owners have put pressure on 
how the protests should be framed and reported on, down to the specific verbiage that 
is used.136 This further reaffirms that the control of Hong Kong’s Press has only 
increased in the last few years. Through the takeover of media ownership by pro-
China businessmen, financial constraints through advertising, established editorial 
norms within the newsroom and the gatekeeping of Chinese information, Hong 
Kong’s press freedom has continued to be constrained by the Central government.  
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Chapter 3: Case study – South China Morning Post 
 
South China Morning Post (SCMP), Hong Kong’s leading English-language 
paper, has maintained its image as a reputable source of information by the general 
public and journalists alike since the handover. While the Hong Kong public’s trust in 
paid newspapers has considerably waned since 1997, SCMP has been consistently 
identified as one of the most credible papers, up until the most recent survey 
administered in 2019.137 Despite this, the reliability and objectiveness of several 
major newspapers were questioned in their reporting of the 2019 pro-democracy 
protests, with SCMP being one of the largest receivers of such criticism.138 Since its 
establishment, it has gone through major changes of ownership through which it has 
fielded claims of self-censorship. Under businessman Robert Kuok and then the 
Chinese internet group Alibaba, numerous editorial decisions and the hiring and firing 
of staff have been the focal points of public criticism. The major controversies that 
have fueled these claims can be viewed through the established framework: the co-
optation of media ownership, newsroom socialization and the skewed access to 
information, all of which have resulted in an increasingly visible editorial shift in 
SCMP’s reporting. 
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Under Robert Kuok’s Kerry Group 
As one of Hong Kong’s oldest surviving papers, SCMP was founded in 1903 
by Tse Tsan-tai, an anti-Qing dynasty political reformer, and journalist Alfred 
Cunningham.139 Just after World War II, the paper was controlled by the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). After some time as a publically listed 
company, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation purchased the paper as part of its 
foray into the Chinese market in 1986. At this time, SCMP had established itself as a 
well-regarded source for reporting on China and was read mainly by a small but 
influential group including expatriates and the Chinese elite.140 Without a clear 
political stance, it was largely known as a pluralistic, establishment paper which 
seldom critiqued the colonial power. The former director of Xinhua News Agency’s 
Hong Kong branch, Xu Jiatun, revealed that China had attempted to purchase the 
highly-respected paper through a third party in the 1980s but failed to so. Robert 
Kuok, a Chinese-Malaysia businessman who already had a 24% share of television 
station TVB at the time, bought a 34.9% majority share in the paper in 1993 from 
Murdoch, who prepared to move from print media to television.141 Kuok already had 
significant investment in China at the time of this purchase, was a member of the 
Preparatory Committee and the Selection Committee for the transition of Hong Kong 
and was named a Hong Kong Affairs Advisor by Xinhua.142 His relationship with 
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China was by no means subtle, as in a 1997 issue, the Economist newspaper referred 
to Kuok as the “largest individual investor in China.”143 Reportedly, Kuok was 
rewarded for this purchase and was able to further his real-estate ventures in China, 
namely the Shangri-La hotels owned by Kuok’s Kerry Group.144 
Kuok’s clearly pre-existing relationship with China aroused fears that his 
ownership would influence the editorial stance of the newspaper. In fact, another 
English-language paper published by the Oriental Daily News Group, Eastern 
Express, began to call itself “the only independent English-language newspaper” 
shortly after this deal.145 There is little doubt that pressure was exerted by this new 
owner but editorial changes appeared very gradually due to resistance by the 
journalists and upper-level management. Initially, Kuok’s presence was little felt, 
possibly due to the highly publicized worry over censorship and external pressure to 
retain editorial independence. One of the first incidents that was heavily reported on 
was the 1995 dismissal of cartoonist Larry Feign amid the cancellation of his popular 
comic strip The World of Lily Wong. The last published issue addressed the sale of 
organs of prisoners by Chinese authorities and called Chinese Premier Li Peng a 
“fascist murderous dog.”146 SCMP editors, such as David Armstrong and Jonathan 
Fenby, defended these changes as part of regular cost-cutting measures, but the fact 
that Feign was number one in the Hong Kong bestsellers chart at the time and the 
editor’s refusal to publish a backlog of pre-paid strips made that claim difficult to 
believe.147 There are accounts of Jonathan Fenby, who had become chief editor of 
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SCMP, asking for changes in articles as early as 1996. Nury Vittachi, a former SCMP 
columnist who was also let go around this time, gave an example of such a change 
when he shared that the headline “Fear for press freedom as Lu lays down ground-
rules” was changed to “Lu sets out ground-rules for press freedom after 1997.”148 For 
the same article, the scrap headline initially quoted Lu saying, “Will someone be 
allowed to write there should be two Chinas? ...absolutely not,” but this was edited by 
Fenby to highlight the quote, “They can criticize, they can object to our policies. They 
can say anything they like.” In this way, this piece was alarmingly changed from 
being one that criticized Chinese authorities to one that praised their response. These 
editorial changes became more common as the date of the handover neared, likely 
because Fenby wanted to prevent angering the incoming regime, rather than on direct 
instructions from the new owner. Another overt move by Fenby was the creation of 
the ‘China Advisor’ position, which was filled by Feng Xiling, founding editor of 
China Daily, an English language paper owned by the Publicity Department of the 
CCP.149 This was believed to have been done on Kuok’s instruction, as the role 
appeared to be a superficial goodwill gesture towards China but had little editorial 
impact. From then on, multiple changes of staff occurred that were believed to have 
been fueled by Kuok’s desire for the paper to take a more pro-China stance and to 
thus remove veteran journalists that may pose a threat.  
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Many of these changes were put into motion by Kuok’s son, Ean Kuok, who 
replaced him as chairman shortly after the handover. At the same time, SCMP’s CEO 
stepped down, and his role was absorbed into the role of the chairman.150 After this 
“buffer” between the proprietor and editorial staff was removed, the proximity 
between the chairman and the day-to-day functions of the paper thereby increased. It 
was reported that at one point, Ean Kuok received a nightly list of headlines that he 
had to approve before publication the next day.151 Amongst the loss of many key 
members of staff, the decision met with most public scrutiny was the demotion of 
Willy Lam from the role of China editor. After 12 years at the paper, 10 in a senior 
role, Lam had established himself as a well-respected journalist both inside and 
outside the organization, so to be demoted without warning was unprecedented.152 
Shortly before his dismissal, he had written on a group of businessmen, including 
Kuok, that had met with Chinese leaders to pledge their support for Hong Kong Chief 
Executive Tung Chee Hwa’s second term in return for business favors.153 This article 
upset Kuok, who wrote an angry letter to chief editor Robert Keatley. Keatley decided 
to go through the regular procedure and publish the letter in the “Letters to the Editor” 
section as sent by “former SCMP chairman.”154 Soon after, Lam was replaced as 
China editor by Wang Xiangwei, who was formerly at pro-China newspaper China 
Daily. Lam resigned shortly after his demotion and many journalists within the 
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organization followed him and wrote letters protesting his treatment.155 Danny 
Gittings and Jasper Becker were some of the next high-profile dismissals. While 
editor Thomas Abraham, close family-friend of Kuok’s, argued that Becker’s firing 
was due to insubordination as he refused to work with China editor Wang, Becker 
told the Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Our copy was being changed or watered 
down. They’re trying to make the coverage more pro-China and they’re just trying to 
find ways to avoid offending people and trying to tone the coverage down a lot.”156 
Fenby, who was constantly defending the paper and its decisions during his tenure as 
chief editor, stated, after he was let go, that “a word from the owner was sufficient to 
dictate editorial policy.”157  
Wang served as chief editor of the paper from 2012 to 2015, and was 
embroiled in his own controversies regarding censorship and his purported pro-China 
stance. In 2012, SCMP reported the death of Tiananmen Square dissident, Li 
Wangyang, by publishing a short brief, while other reputable papers examined the 
suspicious circumstances of it in length.158 An email was leaked through the Asia 
Sentinel which showed sub-editor, Alex Price, questioning Wang on this decision and 
even writing that it could be read as self-censorship, but the chief editor simply stated 
that he did not need to defend his decision. After the leak of these emails, SCMP 
proceeded to run numerous stories on the death, but the controversy had already done 
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damage to the paper’s reputation. Under Wang, numerous former SCMP journalists 
have claimed that it was particularly difficult to report on China without facing 
censorship.159 Paul Mooney, an award-winning China reporter, wrote a revealing 
piece in the Asia Sentinel on the circumstances surrounding his dismissal from the 
paper. He claimed that his desire to write a story on Geng He, the wife of human 
rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, marked the end of his tenure at SCMP, and stated that 
many journalists were let go before him for writing a story that did not show China in 
a good light. He writes, “Talk to anyone on the China reporting team at the South 
China Morning Post and they’ll tell you a story about how Wang has cut their stories, 
or asked them to do an uninteresting story that was favorable to China.”160 He gave 
the example of Leu Siew Ying, a Malaysian journalist who was let go after fighting to 
do a follow-up story on the Taishi protests but was not permitted to do so by then 
China editor, Wang. Mooney attributed the selection of Wang as chief editor to his 
close ties to China as member of the Jinlin Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference and believed that he received special treatment from Kuok for this very 
reason.161 After his dismissal, Mooney stated that there were no more foreign 
journalists reporting on China in the organization. SCMP’s online editor under Wang 
told the New York Times that while it was clear censorship was occurring within the 
organization, it was done in a subtle manner, so was not always visible externally. He 
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said, “It was often done in a very hush-hush manner. You could see that people were 
not exactly free to speak their minds.”162 
 
Under the Alibaba Group 
 After 22 years under Kuok’s Kerry Group, mainland Chinese multinational 
technology company Alibaba announced that they were acquiring the paper for 
HKD$2.06 billion.163 Jack Ma, founder of the group, and Joseph Tsai, executive vice 
chairman, moved away from SCMP’s previous subtlety by making clear what the 
group’s intentions were by acquiring the paper. In an interview with SCMP on the day 
the purchase was announced, Tsai claimed that their editorial policy would be to 
provide a perspective on China that was different than what was commonly presented 
by Western media outlets. He said: 
The coverage about China should be balanced and fair. Today when I see 
mainstream western news organisations cover China, they cover it through a very 
particular lens. It is through the lens that China is a communist state and 
everything kind of follows from that. A lot of journalists working with these 
western media organisations may not agree with the system of governance in 
China and that taints their view of coverage. We see things differently, we believe 
things should be presented as they are.164  
                                                
162 Javier C. Hernández, “A Hong Kong Newspaper on a Mission to Promote China’s 
Soft Power,” The New York Times, March 31, 2018, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/world/asia/south-china-morning-post-hong-
kong-alibaba.html. 
163 Huang and Song, The Evolving Landscape of Media and Communication in Hong 
Kong: 25. 
164 Chow Chung-yan, “Alibaba Buys the South China Morning Post: Full Q&A with 
Executive Vice Chairman Joseph Tsai,” South China Morning Post, December 11, 
2015, sec. News, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1890057/alibaba-
buys-south-china-morning-post-full-qa-executive-vice-chairman. 
	 55	
Ma reaffirmed this goal in his own interview when he stated, “The more I come to 
know about the outside world’s perception of China, the more I feel there are all sorts 
of misunderstandings and, to a certain extent, people do not get the full picture from 
the media.”165 These comments raised alarm bells for a lot of journalists and activists, 
as they implied that SCMP’s reporting on China was going to be generally positive, 
rather than objective.166  
 In the same interview, Tsai stated that the vision of SCMP under Alibaba 
would be to focus on global readership through technology and digital means of 
distribution. On the first official day of Alibaba’s ownership of SCMP, 5 April 2016, 
the paywall on the site was removed and a new SCMP Mobile app was launched. The 
chief editor, Tammy Tam, stated that this was to “grow its readership globally” as 
“China plays an increasingly critical role in world politics and the economy.”167 A 
few months later, SCMP took down their Chinese-language website, nanzao.com, in 
order to “integrate resources” according to the organization.168 Now TV reported that 
in an internal meeting, management told staff that SCMP’s main audience should be 
English not Chinese readers.169 Additionally, SCMP under Alibaba discontinued 
many subsidiary publications include HK Magazine, a popular alternative magazine 
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that had a largely local readership, and even announced that its archive would be 
deleted, a decision that they overturned later after significant backlash.170 Although 
SCMP claimed this was due to the market conditions for print media, Zach Hines, 
former editor-in-chief of the magazine, believed that this was part of their 
prioritization of overseas readership.171 Although the newspaper, which relied on its 
print publication for a large part of their profit, was not profitable, the changes made 
by Alibaba seemed to have the desired effect. Since January of 2017, SCMP saw its 
international readership increase by eight times, according to SCMP CEO, Gary 
Liu.172 Additionally, as of 2018, SCMP was more read digitally than in print and its 
largest audience was American readers.173 This decision to pivot to international 
readership over local falls in line with what an Initium journalist believes is China’s 
larger press strategy. She says, “They have realized that they can’t influence Hong 
Kong readers very much, but can influence mainland Chinese readers and readers 
overseas.”174 
 SCMP under Alibaba has also been the subject of criticism for numerous 
interviews published under mysterious circumstances or without the inclusion of 
sufficient context. In an interview published first on SCMP’s Chinese site in July 
2016 and then translated for their English site, Zhao Wei, legal assistant to a human 
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rights lawyer, was interviewed over the phone by an unnamed “SCMP journalist” 
who reported that Zhao regretted her activism.175 The article claimed that she stated 
she had been released on bail a week prior and was staying in her parent’s house, 
although the paper could verify her location.176 Considering that her husband and her 
lawyer had been unable to reach her, many believe that this interview was facilitated 
by the Chinese government, a claim that SCMP did not refute or agree to. In 2018, 
SCMP participated in a government-arranged interview of Gui Minhai where he made 
a confession that was believed to have been coerced by the Chinese government.177 
This significantly hurt the credibility of SCMP as an independent news organization, 
and many academics and journalists expressed outrage at the publication of this 
interview.178 Stephen Vines, former SCMP journalist, in an article he wrote in the 
Hong Kong Free Press, believed that SCMP’s participation in the interview gave it a 
sense of undeserved legitimacy and cited this decision as one of the factors that lead 
to him leaving the organization.179 SCMP has also lost a number of journalists over 
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claims of censorship by editors.180 Alice Woodhouse shared on Twitter that before she 
left SCMP in 2016, “balanced and fair” city desk reporters were faced with editors 
who would put a spin on their work and select headlines.181 Journalists from 
Bloomberg China and the Initium both shared that their friends at SCMP complained 
that pressure from editors when writing articles increased significantly after the 2019 
protests.182 
 
Textual Analysis of Editorials from 1995, 2005, 2019 
Observing news editorials, often written by editors significantly high up in the 
organizational hierarchy, can be a method through which to gage the editorial stance 
of a news organization. SCMP’s editorials are never attributed to a particular author, 
and instead are placed above the names of SCMP’s editorial board. Thus, the 
implication persists that the opinions shared in the editorials are those of the editorial 
staff. Considering this, SCMP’s editorials provide a window into the stance of the 
entire organization and by analyzing those published in October of 1995, October of 
2005 and October and November of 2019, any editorial shift that may have occurred 
in the past two decades will emerge. 
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October 1995 
In 1995, SCMP had only just come under the ownership of Kuok, who was 
being careful to preserve SCMP’s image of editorial independence. However, this was 
merely a few months after the dismissal of Larry Feign, indicating that there was line 
that could not be crossed. Approaching the July 1, 1997 date of the handover, many of 
SCMP’s editorials were on the future of Hong Kong under China, therefore providing 
significant material through which to analyze SCMP’s reporting of China at the time. 
An October 25, 1995 editorial described SCMP’s expansion plans with included a 
new plant, facilities and possibly a new China edition of the paper. The editorial 
stated that this venture was “an expression of confidence in the strength of the 
newspaper as an independent organ of news and opinion” and that the Post “believes 
in the future prosperity of Hong Kong and China and the dynamism of the region.”183 
Another editorial praised China’s decision to work with Britain in securing visa-free 
privileges to those with the Special Administrative Region passport, stating that “joint 
efforts were off to a good start.”184 Despite this, there were, surprisingly, more 
editorials critical of China than those that painted the Chinese government in a 
particularly positive light. Five editorials from the month were explicitly critical of 
the government, with two harshly rebuking China’s plans to amend Hong Kong’s Bill 
of Rights.185 “China’s planned emasculation of the Bill of Rights is an outrageous act 
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which raises doubts about Hong Kong’s promised autonomy after 1997,” starts one 
such editorial, which states that China’s proposal to revive colonial laws is a violation 
of the Basic Law.186 At the same time, the writer believed that critics were wrong to 
suggest that this has dire consequences for human rights in Hong Kong, as civil 
liberties “cannot simply be legislated into existence.” Another critical editorial 
discussed the conviction of a Chinese-Australian businessman and stated that the 
arbitrary application of Chinese law will discourage foreign businessman from 
investing in the region, therefore proposed removing ambiguity from the 
businessman’s sentence and trial.187 These editorials suggest that in 1995, SCMP 
journalists were able to write freely on China as long as they adhered to a certain level 
of respectability. Editorials that were overtly critical tended to include the other side, 
at least to a degree, and didn’t end without suggesting ways to move forward, 
therefore indicating that there was room for improvement. 
 
October 2005 
 Ten years later, SCMP’s proprietors had managed to make significant changes 
to the management of the paper and had a much stronger grasp on the day-to-day 
editorial functions of the organization. The shift in the subject areas of the editorials 
was clear, as there were significantly fewer written on the Chinese government. A 
much stronger focus on international news can be noticed, with multiple editorials on 
Japan’s prime minister, Iraq’s constitutional referendum, Pakistan’s earthquake 
disaster, and even the functioning of international organizations including the United 
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Nations and the International Monetary Foundation.188 More local cultural trends 
were written about, including editorials on trendy Hong Kong women breaking 
stereotypes or the dating habits of expats, and a surprisingly high number were 
dedicated to the reform of Hong Kong’s public places.189 Hong Kong’s chief 
executive at the time, Donald Tsang, received a healthy amount of criticism, however 
no editorials were particularly aggressive towards the official.190 On October 1, the 
National Day of the People’s Republic of China, one editorial discussed the “common 
bond” between those who identified as Hongkongese and Chinese, and stated that 
both groups felt proud of their Chinese heritage.191 Another few editorials celebrated 
China’s second manned space mission, shared hopes for China to become a leading 
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space power and showed support for President Hu Jintao’s five-year economic 
program.192 Because editorials on China were so rare and generally positive, the only 
two that were overtly critical were highly noticeable and stood out. On October 11, an 
editorial called for Beijing to put a stop to the violence inflicted on Taishi villagers, 
who were fighting for their corrupt chief to take accountability, and highlighted the 
fact that no senior officials had publicly addressed the attacks.193 Another editorial ten 
days later commented on Hong Kong’s slow road to democracy and asked Beijing for 
a time table on when universal suffrage was going to be introduced.194 Like before, 
both these editorials ended with suggestions for the Chinese government. With a 
smaller number of editorials on mainland politics, it seems that writing on the Chinese 
government or on potentially controversial issues is avoided altogether. The editorials 
that were critical were possibly included to uphold the reputation of SCMP as an 
independent paper and follow the lead of other liberal news organizations, as not 
publishing any comments about the Taishi villagers would have been noticeable and 
attracted criticism. 
 
October and November 2019 
 Now under Alibaba, SCMP was facing increased scrutiny over censorship and 
critics claimed that the editorial board had a pro-China stance. In the second half of 
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2019, Hong Kong was in the midst of massive pro-democracy protests by students 
against a proposed extradition bill. Most of the editorials published by SCMP from 
the end of October to the end of November were regarding these protests, and 
illustrated clearly the stance of the organization towards the crisis. As the protests 
escalated through November, the editorials became increasingly hostile towards the 
protestors. Three different editorials in the span of this month advocated for 
extradition treaties in the context of the Taiwan murder case, clearly indicating that 
SCMP was not sympathetic to the demands of the protestors.195 Despite of this, the 
editorials published initially were not particularly aggressive and called for the police 
to respect journalists, asked the Hong Kong government to protect the public from 
doxxing, and uphold the rule of law and the “one country, two systems” principle in 
responding to the protests.196 However, this changed midway through November and 
the editorials went from referring to the protests as “unrest” or a “political crisis” to 
“acts of violence.”197 One editorial stated that the death of the student that occurred 
during the protests called for a show of respect, “not further violence.”198 It referred to 
the protests against the police that were occurring in response to the death as “a 
                                                
195 “Surrender of Murder Suspect Just the Start,” South China Morning Post, October 
21, 2019; “Focus Should Be on Justice Not Politics in Taiwan Murder Case,” South 
China Morning Post, October 24, 2019; “Why We Still Need Extradition Deals,” 
South China Morning Post, November 11, 2019. 
196 “Police Must Respect Role of Journalists,” South China Morning Post, November 
1, 2019; “Protect Police from Doxxing, but Don’t Forget the Rest of Us,” South China 
Morning Post, October 29, 2019; “Rule of Law Must Not Be Sacrificed to Deal with 
Political Crisis,” South China Morning Post, November 2, 2019; “Safeguarding ‘one 
Country, Two Systems’ Must Be the Priority,” South China Morning Post, November 
4, 2019. 
197 “District Council Polls Must Not Be Delayed by Acts of Violence,” South China 
Morning Post, November 8, 2019; “Reconciliation Needs Dialogue, but First the 
Violence Must End,” South China Morning Post, November 12, 2019; “As Violence 
Escalates, Put Public Safety First,” South China Morning Post, November 13, 2019. 
198 “Death of Student Calls for Show of Respect, Not Further Violence,” South China 
Morning Post, November 9, 2019. 
	 64	
worrying example of people forming strong views before they get the facts.” Two 
editorials discussed the universities’ involvement in the protests. One stated that 
“universities must not become breeding grounds for violence” and that the use of the 
campus for “illegal activities” calls into question “the academic freedom and 
independence that make universities special in societies.”199 Another claimed that 
“universities have to meet expectations of society or fear the worst.”200 Finally, an 
editorial titled “Spirit of Hong Kong is alive and well” celebrated the help of the 
public in the city’s clean-up as a response to “six months of protests, violence and 
vandalism [which] have stretched Hong Kong’s resources and patience.”201 While 
some editorials offered suggestions to the Chinese government in regard to proposed 
policies, criticism of the government was entirely absent. This observation, coupled 
with the clear stance against the pro-democracy protests, suggests that the editorial 
stance of SCMP under Alibaba aligns closely with that of the mainland government. 
This overt position marks a departure from the management of SCMP under Kuok, as 
there are no noticeable attempts to uphold the appearance of SCMP’s editorial 
freedom.  
 
Textual Analysis of SCMP’s reporting on major Hong Kong events 
 While editorials directly signify a news organization’s stance, the observation 
of general reporting by the newspaper may highlight cases of censorship through the 
way events are framed and the headlines that are selected. SCMP’s reporting of 
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Governor Patten’s 1994 democratic reforms, the 2003 Article 23 protests and the 
2019 pro-democracy protests may reveal the changing editorial practices over the 
years and under different ownership, as well as the approach of the organization 
towards the politicized events. 
 
Patten’s democratic reforms 
 Chris Patten became the last Governor of Hong Kong in 1992 and took the 
lead on reforming Hong Kong’s electoral system by widening the eligible electorate 
to the point that all of Hong Kong’s working population would be able to vote for 
members of the Legislative Council.202 The CCP did not respond well to these 
reforms and consistently attacked the Governor, often through state-owned media 
agency, Xinhua. Patten was also publicly an advocate for the freedom of press, and 
believed in necessary legal reform to ensure it.203 When Patten announced the reforms 
in 1992, SCMP was still under Murdoch and there had been no claims made of 
censorship. The newspaper’s reporting on Patten’s reforms seems to adhere to this 
assumption. Public opinion of the reforms was written about often and multiple 
opinion polls were taken to gage the Hong Kong public’s perception.204 It seemed that 
initially, these reforms were seen as too drastic and thought to potentially jeopardize 
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Hong Kong’s transition in the future.205 As China aggressively opposed them, the 
public, which was previously undecided, followed suite.206 However, by December of 
1992, the Legislative Council voted in support of the reforms and the majority of 
those polled by SCMP were also behind Patten’s reforms.207 SCMP’s reporting 
seemed to follow the perception of the public and an editorial stance on the issue did 
not emerge. Much of the reporting followed Patten’s negotiation with China on the 
reforms and initially, most articles portrayed Patten as idealistic but then changed to 
viewing China’s assumption that Patten will back down as “unrealistic.”208 Politics 
writer at the time, Andy Ho, wrote often on the subject, but merely assessed the 
circumstances of the reforms and offered Patten light suggestions, therefore did not 
take one side over the other.209 In December of 1992, SCMP posted a full-page notice 
that was signed by many financial services professionals who opined that Patten’s 
reform package was sacrificing stability and prosperity for a “Utopian democracy” 
and would harm Hong Kong’s economy.210 Despite of this, this notice appeared to be 
published as an advertisement rather than the organization’s endorsement. 
Considering SCMP’s reporting in the months following Patten’s announcement of the 
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reforms, the paper at this time seemed to be dependent on public perception rather 
than an editorial stance. 
 
Article 23 Protests 
 Article 23, the bill prohibiting acts of “treason, secession, subversion against 
the Central People’s Government” which was unable, was drafted into the Basic Law, 
Hong Kong’s 1997 mini-constitution.211 In February of 2003, the National Security 
Bill was introduced to the Legislative Council and was met with significant backlash 
from the Hong Kong public, who believed that it would curb the freedom of press in 
the city.212 On July 1 of 2003, before the vote on the Article was held, a major 
demonstration took place that was spearheaded by pro-democracy news organizations 
such as Apple Daily.213 At this time, Kuok had made important changes to SCMP’s 
management and complains of censorship were plenty, namely after the resignation of 
Willy Lam. Despite of this, SCMP reported heavily on these protests. Up to a week 
after the demonstration, a few pages at the beginning of every issue were dedicated 
solely to news on Article 23 and a countdown to the day of the vote on the bill was 
updated every day. The day after the demonstration, SCMP ran a story on the front 
page titled “500,000 take to the streets.”214 The headline was accompanied by a brief 
but powerful statement: “The government says the national security legislation will 
not limit the freedoms of Hong Kong people. Yesterday, the people staged the city’s 
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biggest protest since 1989 to show they are not convinced.” SCMP’s reporting on the 
demonstrations was consistently this emotive. Another article a few days later was 
headlined, “Shows of angers that brought change.”215 A week after the demonstration, 
the paper even addressed the Chinese government directly on the front page through 
the headline, “Beijing remains silent on Tung crisis.”216 Additionally, the protestors 
were characterized in a distinctly positive light, as one article claimed that a survey 
showed that they were well educated and another, published the day after the July 1 
demonstration, highlighted that no arrests were made due to the protest being 
orderly.217 Although by this time, SCMP journalists were already conscious about not 
upsetting their editors and pro-China owners, SCMP had a strong incentive to 
maintain its reputation as an independent publication. This would mean that the paper 
had to openly report on major local news in a way that is honest and matched the 
gravity of the issue. SCMP has maintained, since its initial purchase by Kuok, that it 
is committed to the freedom of press. With Article 23 challenging that, it would make 
sense for the paper to extensively report on the demonstrations and the bill while 
making it clear which side they stand on. 
 
Pro-democracy protests of 2019 
 In the summer of 2019, protests began in Hong Kong after the introduction of 
a bill that would allow the extradition of those convicted in Hong Kong to mainland 
                                                
215 Gary Cheung, “Shows of Anger That Brought Change,” South China Morning 
Post, July 5, 2003, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
216 Wang Xiangwei and Jimmy Cheung, “Beijing Remains Silent on Tung Crisis,” 
South China Morning Post, July 8, 2003, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
217 Louisa Yan, “July 1 Marchers Were Well-Educated, Says Survey,” South China 
Morning Post, July 7, 2003, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Elaine Wu, “No 
Arrests throughout Orderly Protest,” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2003, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
	 69	
China. Protestors believed that this bill would undermined the principle of “one 
country, two systems” as it would infringe upon the legal autonomy of the Special 
Administrative Region. As these protests escalated, demands moved from the 
rejection of the extradition bill to larger pro-democracy objectives including universal 
suffrage. SCMP’s coverage of the protests was looked at critically by many 
journalists. A journalist from the Apple Daily stated that she noticed SCMP using a 
lot of extreme descriptions of the protestors in their reporting, such as referring to 
them as rioters or even anarchists.218 Looking at the verbiage used in the paper’s 
articles on the protests, its stance against the protests is clear. While, for example, 
Bloomberg reported that “Hong Kong pro-democracy activists demonstrated for the 
21st straight weekend,” SCMP reported that “Hong Kong marked its 21st straight 
weekend of anti-government protests as radicals went on a rampage.”219 Articles on 
the protest are often accompanied by pictures of protestors or destruction that some 
deem sensationalist. One such article was on the front page of SCMP’s print 
newspaper on September 1, 2019.220 It was headlined “The night the city was set 
ablaze” and was printed alongside a large picture of a raging fire. Numerous 
journalists shared their disapproval of this on social media, and stated that it implied 
that a large fire ran through the city when in actuality, the fire was extinguished very 
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quickly.221 SCMP has also maintained a pro-police stance in its coverage of the 
protests and has published articles such as one headlined “How Hong Kong’s 
embattled police force is holding the city back from the brink against all odds.”222 
When a video surfaced that showed the police beating up protestors at the Prince 
Edward MTR station, most local news organizations reported on the police brutality 
that was witnessed. While the headline of SCMP’s article on this reflected the same, 
the actual article dedicated the first few paragraphs to describing the vandalism by the 
protestors and only mentioned the brutality further down.223 Finally, Yonden Lhatoo, 
SCMP columnist and news editor, wrote an article discussing the existence of a silent 
majority, however included poll data in that very article that indicated that the 
majority of those surveyed were sympathetic to the protestors’ demands.224 Lhatoo 
relied on anonymous letters received by SCMP to make his point. The same 
unsupported claim can be found in the reporting of CCP-owned newspaper, China 
Daily.225 With a primarily global readership, SCMP has the unique power to be the 
window into Hong Kong for foreign readers. This is why their reporting is significant 
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in shaping the narratives of the protests on the global stage, as their readers are 
unlikely to read other local papers and have no basis of comparison. Thus, the clear 
pro-China stance that is observed through their reporting of the events is particularly 
worrying.  
 
Conclusion  
 While SCMP is still globally regarded as a reputable source for information on 
Hong Kong and China, its purchase by Kuok and then the Alibaba group has created a 
culture of censorship within the organization that has curbed its ability to report 
objectively and critically on China. Under Alibaba, the stance of the news 
organization became increasingly overt and as the group has enough capital to sustain 
the news organization even when it is in the red, the economic incentive to uphold an 
image of editorial freedom no longer applied and its primary readership, which is 
foreign, is less likely to be aware of the editorial censorship. However, the 
organization is seemingly conscious of the diminishing trust in its reporting. In March 
of 2020, the SCMP website began showing a tab with the words “Why you can trust 
SCMP” under the author bar of every article, which on-click, redirects to a page that 
outlines their policies and standards, including information on their ownership 
structure and affirmations that the paper is functioning independently.226 Additionally, 
SCMP became the first news organization in Asia to join the Trust Project in the 
same, which is an initiative that “provides standards of news production to help 
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readers identify credible journalism.”227 Although SCMP is being criticized often by 
local journalists and Hong Kong’s population has become increasingly aware of its 
censorship, it is difficult to say whether its global reputation will be affected due to its 
well-established status as a respected news source for much of the world.  
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Conclusion 
 
 As we move to towards the 2047 date which signifies the expiration of the 
“one country, two systems” principle, journalists are largely pessimistic about the 
future of Hong Kong’s press freedom. With China already significantly tightening the 
controls on Hong Kong’s book publishing and journalism industries under Xi Jinping, 
there is an assumption that this will continue to be the trend as Hong Kong faces 
increasing pressure from China. The fear and uncertainty surrounding the publishing 
of critical political content has slowly discouraged Hong Kong authors and journalists 
from challenging China’s arbitrary limits. This indicates that journalists and writers in 
Hong Kong are now much less willing to even approach the line of what is permitted. 
Jin believes that this attitude has created a culture of self-censorship within the book 
publishing industry that has prevented the publication of books that would have been 
perfectly acceptable. This has taken a toll on not only the profession of publishing but 
on Hong Kong-based authors as well, as those who are willing to test the boundaries 
are left with few prospects for publication. 
Numerous journalists have suggested that the journalism profession in Hong 
Kong similarly appears to be at risk. An Apple Daily journalist stated that 
investigative journalists are increasingly changing professions due to a variety of 
factors.228 The tolerance for stories exposing Chinese elite has considerably decreased 
and the barriers to accessing information have made it difficult for them to do their 
job. Additionally, she expressed that there is less money in journalism than there has 
ever been. While journalism was never a high-paying profession, news organizations 
are facing a lot of financial pressure, especially if they are overtly pro-democracy like 
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Apple Daily. Those that work in this industry are often very passionate about the work 
that they do, therefore are willing to take a lower pay.229 This is adding downward 
pressure to the wages of journalists. The same journalist stated that Ming Pao was 
known to pay especially low wages to highly experienced journalists if they don’t 
explicitly request a pay increase.230  
As the 2014 Occupy Movement played a large role in increasing restrictions 
on book publishers, the 2019 pro-democracy protests may have a similar impact on 
journalists by increasing the level of danger associated with the profession. Journalists 
that attended the protests were treated in a noticeably aggressive manner from the 
police, to the extent that Reporters Without Borders attributed this treatment as one of 
the reasons they lowered Hong Kong’s ranking on the Press Freedom Index.231 From 
being pushed around to being pepper sprayed and hit by rubber bullets, Hong Kong 
journalists were victims of significant brutality.232 This harassment has extended 
outside the context of the protests. On April 29, 2020, two Next Magazine reporters 
who were allegedly doing a story on a senior police official were arrested for 
loitering.233 Although they were later released, the police expressed no regret for their 
actions. There have also been concerns over the privacy of journalists reporting on the 
protests. A Bloomberg China journalist expressed that in August of 2019, more than 
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30 ethnically Chinese, female journalists were doxed by an anonymous Twitter 
account, with one of them being her.234 After this, she began receiving a lot of hate 
comments on her Twitter. She stated that a similar thing was happening in China 
through a website named HKLeaks which was releasing the name, organization, 
photo and even the phone numbers of journalists who were covering the Hong Kong 
protests.235  
Although the events surrounding the pro-democracy protests have further 
damaged the journalism profession in Hong Kong in certain ways, they have also 
reaffirmed the commitment of the Hong Kong public to objective reporting. Jin 
discussed the prevalence of “we media” in Hong Kong, which began with the 
popularity of the smart phone.236 As the general public became increasingly 
suspicious of formal news outlets, especially in the reporting of the protests, people 
became their own news sources and shared pictures and videos of events through the 
internet. While China is able to put up firewalls and censor this information, Hong 
Kong has complete freedom of information and information can be easily 
disseminated in this manner. The Bloomberg China journalist also shared that in her 
opinion, the protests have made the Hong Kong public more aware of the censorship 
the media is facing. There has been an uptick in the support of independent 
newsrooms and there is a greater sense of which news sources are reliable. In this 
way, she believes that the protests have improved media literacy among Hong Kong’s 
population.237 This goes to show that while China’s efforts to curb Hong Kong’s press 
freedom have been largely successful and there is no doubt that China will exercise 
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increasing pressure in the coming years, the Hong Kong people have demonstrated 
that freedom of speech and expression is something that they are willing to fight for.  
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